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There are two reasons for drawing attention to the social dimen-
sion of European Community law. First, the EEC treaty comprises
different provisions on social policy whose importance is consistently
underestimated: the treaty is often considered as merely establishing a
"common market" and as only concerning economic problems. This
approach is prominent in the United States, where the business world
is primarily interested in trade with, and within, the common market,
and where much literature is devoted to this subject. Second, the so-
cial provisions of the EEC treaty have given rise to an interesting
evolution in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities, on equal protection in particular. As a result, the Court's
case law has gradually begun to show some interesting parallels with
previous developments in American law.
I. THE TREATY PROVISIONS
It is true that the EEC treaty is principally concerned with estab-
lishing a common market, which is the Community's main task'
There is no doubt, however, that it includes some important elements
of social policy. According to article 3, free movement of persons
within the territory of the Community is one of its aims: obstacles to
freedom of movement for persons must be abolished.2 The treaty has
a separate chapter on free movement of workers: elaborate provisions
deal with problems like giving access to employment, abolishing dis-
crimination between workers on grounds of nationality, and organiz-
ing the application of social security systems to migrant workers. 3
This is a very important chapter, as it implies limitations on the mem-
ber states' powers to expel aliens, to authorize or refuse residence on
* Thijmen Koopmans, a former Leyden professor of constitutional law, has been a judge at
the Court of Justice of the European Communities since 1979. He is a fellow of Trinity College,
Cambridge, and a member of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences.
1. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 298 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinaf-
ter EEC treaty], art. 2.
2. Id., art. 3(c).
3. Id., arts. 48-51.
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their territory and, in general, to regulate immigration - powers
which are often considered a central part of national sovereignty. As a
result, it took about ten years to issue all of the different regulations
and directives necessary for implementing these treaty provisions.
The treaty also contains a title on social policy in general, subdi-
vided into two chapters. The title provides for cooperation in the field
of labor relations, for harmonization of health and safety rules for
workers, for a common system of financing new employment opportu-
nities and for a common policy in the field of vocational training. 4
These provisions are weaker than the ones on free movement of work-
ers in the sense that the treaty does not create a clear mechanism for
ensuring their implementation. Although it gives certain powers to
the Council and the Commission of the Community, the treaty does
not invest them with a general jurisdiction in these matters. However,
as we shall presently see, that does not alter the fact that these matters
are covered by the treaty. The conclusion that these matters fall within
the scope of the treaty's application may, in turn, have certain legal
effects.
The same title on social policy includes a specific and clear-cut rule
on equal pay for male and female workers.5 It states that equal pay for
equal work is a "principle" which is to be ensured and maintained by
the member states. This provision, article 119, raised many difficulties
which are only gradually being solved by the case law of the Court of
Justice and the national courts. The provision also formed the basis for
some important Community directives on equal treatment of men and
women in the field of labor relations in general.
Article 119 may have been inserted into the treaty for economic
rather than social reasons. At the time the EEC treaty was concluded,
some member states, France in particular, were very anxious about
"social dumping" which could disfavor their industries. This idea ap-
pears explicitly in some treaty provisions, such as the protocol on cer-
tain provisions relating to France, which includes rules on payment
for overtime. The objective of the protocol was, within a certain pe-
riod of time, to set a rate of additional payment for overtime in indus-
try corresponding to the average payment being obtained in France. If
this situation were not brought about by the end of the period, France
would be authorized to take protective measures. The existence of this
protocol suggests that similar concerns may have guided the hand of
4. Id., arts. 118, 118A, 123-127, 128, respectively.
5. Id., art. 119.
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the drafters of article 119. In any case, the provision has developed
into one of the major instruments of social policy in the Community.
Community institutions have been more active in some areas of
social policy than in others. The European Court's case law has
tended to strengthen, in particular, the prohibitions against discrimi-
nation. I shall dwell on three examples of this portion of the Court's
case law, taken, respectively, from cases on free movement of workers,
on sex discrimination, and on access to national education systems.
II. FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS
Free movement of workers, over the years, has proved to be a fer-
tile area for the development of the Court's case law. In an early case
involving social security,6 for example, the Court took the opportunity
to examine the very nature of the Community and to contrast it with
traditional forms of international collaboration. In its preliminary rul-
ing, the Court also outlined methods of interpreting Community law
that diverged from those used in traditional international law. 7
For equal protection, the point of departure is the treaty rule, in
article 48, that free movement of workers implies "the abolition of any
discrimination based on nationality" as regards employment, remu-
neration and other conditions of work.8 The Court has held that the
prohibition against discrimination not only strikes at unequal treat-
ment based directly on nationality, but at any other standard which,
though not referring to national origin, has the practical result of af-
fecting the same category of people. In Sotgiu v. Deutsche Bundespost,
an Italian was employed in the Federal Republic of Germany while
maintaining residence in his home country. German labor law treated
him differently because he did not reside within German territory.9
The Court held that rules on equality of treatment forbid "not only
overt discrimination by reason of nationality, but also all covert forms
of discrimination which, by the application of other criteria of differ-
entiation, lead in fact to the same result."' 0 Thus, standards relating
to the residence or place of origin of a worker might, "according to
circumstances, be tantamount, as regards their practical effect, to dis-
crimination on grounds of nationality." However, such would not be
the case with differentiations which "took account of objective differ-
6. Unger v. Bestuur der Bedrijfsvereniging voor Detailhandel en Ambachten, case 75/63,
1964 EUR. CT. REP. 177.
7. Id. at 184-85.
8. EEC treaty, art. 48, § 2.
9. Sotgiu v. Deutsche Bundespost, case 152/73, 1974 EUR. CT. REP. 153.
10. Id. at 164.
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ences which the situation of workers may involve."" The judgment
then examines separation allowances, which, under certain circum-
stances, may be an example of such a differentiation founded on objec-
tive differences. The upshot of the decision is that residence has
become what the U.S. Supreme Court would call a suspect
classification.
The Court of Justice has, moreover, given wide scope to the non-
discrimination rule. It has held that this rule applies not only to em-
ployment and working conditions in a strict sense, but that it may also
touch on living conditions in the host country. The leading case of
Netherlands v. Reed concerned a woman who was a British citizen
working and residing in the Netherlands. She was living with another
British citizen without being married to him. When her employment
ended, she was served with notice that she had to leave the country, as
she was no longer a "worker" protected by EEC rules. 12 In her appli-
cation to the Dutch courts, she relied on two arguments. First, she
said, she would have been protected by EEC rules if she had been
married to her British friend: she would then have had the protected
status of being the "spouse" of a Community worker. Because, she
argued, the concept of a spouse in marriage is evolving with current
societal morality and increasingly assimilating other steady links be-
tween men and women into its definition, the concept was not to be
taken so literally as to exclude this case. Second, she claimed that she
would have been able to remain in the Netherlands if her friend had
been a Dutch national. Indeed, there appeared to be a Dutch adminis-
trative practice that foreigners living with Dutch nationals would not
be expelled, even when without a job in the country. The Dutch ap-
peals court referred these two problems to the Court of Justice for
preliminary rulings. 13 The Court's reaction was typical. On the first
point, it noted that the rhythm of social evolution was not the same in
the different member states and that, anyway, definitions of marriage,
spouse, children, members of the family, etc. were to be determined
according to the applicable (national) family law. 14 On the second
point, however, the Court held that the authorities of a member state
were not at liberty to expel citizens of other member states having a
steady relationship with a compatriot if the same authorities would
consider the relationship in a different light if it existed with a national
11. Id. at 165.
12. Netherlands v. Reed, case 59/85, 1986 EUR. CT. REP. 1283.
13. See EEC treaty, art. 177, which authorizes the Court of Justice to make preliminary
decisions upon referral.
14. Netherlands v. Reed, 1986 EUR. CT. REP. at 1299-1301.
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of their own country.' 5 The judgment illustrates that, in some in-
stances, general living conditions may be directly relevant to equal
protection problems in the employment field.
Case law on equal protection also helped to define the rights of
children of migrant workers and, more generally, of "second genera-
tion" immigrants. The treaty provisions are completely silent on their
position and, curiously enough, the implementing regulations are not
very elaborate either; they do not reveal that their drafters really con-
sidered the possibility that workers from other member states might
simply prefer to remain in the host country with their family.1 6 But
this category of migrants, forgotten by the drafters of the treaty and
only occasionally remembered by the implementing measures, benefit-
ted from the way in which the Court applied the non-discrimination
rule to them. It held, for example, that Belgian authorities could not
refuse a scholarship to attend arts school in Germany to a young art
teacher who happened to be an Italian national. The teacher had been
born in Belgium to an Italian worker and had had her entire education
in Belgium. ' 7 The Belgian government argued that, because of a bilat-
eral agreement on cultural exchanges between Belgium and the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany which made scholarships available only to
nationals of those two countries, the Belgian authorities had no choice
but to refuse. The Court's dry response was that a bilateral arrange-
ment between member states cannot relieve them of the obligation to
observe Community law.
III. SEX DISCRIMINATION
Cases on sex discrimination - or, as American terminology has it
nowadays, discrimination based on gender - show similar problems
and comparable solutions.18
Sex discrimination has soon been found to exist in covert forms.
The first case before the Court of Justice involved hourly wage rates in
the clothing industry. A British company applied a lower hourly rate
to part-time workers.' 9 The national court which referred the matter
to the Court had established that all part-time workers in the company
15. Id. at 1304.
16. Regulation No. 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community,
196811 O.J. EUR. COMM. (Special Edition) (No. L 257) 477-78 (1968) (act of the Council).
17. Matteucci v. Communaut6 francaise de Belgique, case 235/87, judgment of Sept. 1988
(not yet reported).
18. See N. BURROWS & S. PRECHAL, GENDER DISCRIMINATION OF THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITY ch. 1 (1989).
19. Jenkins v. Kingsgate Clothing Productions, case 96/80, 1981 EUR. CT, REP. 911.
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were female, the only exception being a man who had retired but
whose help was still necessary for limited technical operations. The
Court of Justice found that under these circumstances, the lower rate
for part-timers, in reality, represented discrimination based on gender,
unless the company could show that it had objective reasons unrelated
to gender for introducing lower pay for part-timers. Such objective
reasons could include economic justifications. This approach was con-
firmed some years later in a German case regarding an occupational
pension scheme which excluded part-time workers. The scheme had
been instituted for workers in department stores, and it was not diffi-
cult to see that the exclusion of part-timers amounted in practice to
excluding female shop assistants. 20 In Europe, married women are
still the main contenders for part-time jobs. The Court insisted again
that differentiations of this kind could only be justified by objective
reasons regardless of sex. Its attitude is generally interpreted to mean
that an employer's mere demonstration of his intent to achieve some
policy objective, like the encouragement of full-time employment, is
not sufficient. 2I Economic aims which are proper to the enterprise in
question may constitute an objective justification, provided, however,
that the measures chosen to attain these ends are appropriate and not
disproportionate to the problems they purport to solve.
Sex discrimination issues also gave rise to cases on the scope of
equal protection. In one case, for example, the Court held that non-
discrimination, under the equal pay rule, has relevance not only for
wages and salaries, but also for other benefits workers may claim be-
cause of having, or having had, a certain job.22 Therefore, British Rail
could not refuse certain benefits to its retired female workers once the
same benefits had been granted to retired male workers. This case
was, in a way, typical of the clash between, on the one hand, tradi-
tional ways of looking at family life and, on the other, the requirement
of non-discrimination on the basis of sex. The railway company in the
case gave free travel to all its retired workers. Only for men, however,
did the arrangement include free travel for members of the former em-
ployee's family.
Exceptions to equal protection rules are narrowly construed by the
Court. The Community directive on equal access to employment al-
lows for some exceptions to the general principle of equal treatment,
for instance, if the "nature" of the job necessarily requires either a
20. Bilka-Kaufhaus v. Karin Weber von Hartz, case 170/84, 1986 EuR. CT. REP. 1607.
21. See D. CURTIN, IRISH EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY LAW 164 (1989).
22. Eileen Garland v. British Rail Eng'g Ltd., case 12/81, 1982 EUR. CT. REP. 359.
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male or a female worker.2 3 The standard illustration of this deroga-
tion is the soprano needed for a Verdi opera; but one could also think
of Cinderella's very ugly sisters in the English pantomime who have to
be, according to the English theatre tradition, male actors. The Court
had to consider the problem in a French police case. 24 The case did
not come from a national court for a preliminary ruling, but on a di-
rect action by the Commission against a member state for failing to
comply with its treaty obligations. 25 The French police (or, at least,
the five national police corps which form the main police force) had
two different ways of recruiting new police officers, one for male and
one for female candidates. Both groups were submitted to the same
entry test, but the police authorities then fixed the percentage of wo-
men to be enlisted in the course of every recruitment process. This
might, to American readers, look like a quota system, but it was not:
there was no fixed number or percentage of females to be employed.
The Commission considered the system as discriminatory and as hav-
ing no justification under Community directives. The French govern-
ment argued, however, that many, or at least some, police jobs
necessarily require persons who are able to exert physical force and
who are not afraid of others who do the same. This reliance on the
requirement of physical force (the "Rambo-argument") is frequently
used in sex discrimination cases. The argument claims that only men
have these abilities and that, therefore, the nature of the job requires
male workers.
The Court was careful in its assessment of the case. It accepted
that "some" police jobs could require the kind of physical force that is
expected from men, and could therefore be reserved to male officers.
However, it held that this particular situation could not justify a differ-
entiation between male and female officers over the whole range of
police careers and for all police jobs. The dual system of recruiting
was "disproportionate" with regard to the legitimate aim it could pur-
sue, or, as the U.S. Supreme Court would put it, "overbroad." Conse-
quently, the "nature" of the job which may justify differential
treatment must relate to specific jobs, not globally to a number of ac-
tivities to be performed by a certain institution or a certain employer.
23. Council Directive 76/207, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 39) 40 art. 2, § 2, (1976) (on the
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to
employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions).
24. Commission of the European Communities v. French Republic, case 318/86, judgment
of June 30, 1988 (not yet reported).
25. EEC treaty, art. 169.
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IV. ACCESS TO EDUCATION
A recent jurisprudential development concerns access to national
systems of education, an area that confirms the emphasis the Court of
Justice has been putting on equal treatment.
This particular extension of non-discrimination rules started with a
case on tuition fees for access to state schools of higher education. 26 It
appeared that Belgium levied fees on foreign students only, including
nationals of other member states. A French girl who was in Liege to
study cartoon drawing (a Belgian specialty) had been ordered to leave
the country. Since she had refused to pay the tuition fee, she could no
longer be considered a student. Alleging Belgian practice to be dis-
criminatory, she commenced an action. The Belgian government de-
fended its case rather weakly, arguing merely that the Community was
an economic community and that it had nothing to do with education,
an area that remained completely governed by national law. The
Court, however, found this statement to be overbroad. It is true, it
said, that matters such as the organization of the educational system
and curricular planning remain entirely subject to national control.
On the other hand, some provisions in the treaty chapter on social
policy explicitly refer to a common policy on vocational training. 27
The implementing measures highlight the necessity of providing access
to vocational training for citizens of other member states. Regulations
on free movement of workers already tend to promote access of mi-
grant workers to this form of schooling. Thus, the Court arrived at
the conclusion that access to vocational training is within the scope of
the EEC treaty. Consequently, it held that the general rule of article 7
of the treaty applied, according to which, within the field of applica-
tion of this Treaty and without prejudice to the special provisions
mentioned therein, any discrimination on the grounds of nationality
shall be prohibited.
The new case law is founded on the concept of "vocational train-
ing," an expression which is somewhat ambiguous. Most schools
serve, in one way or another, to prepare pupils and students for jobs or
professions, but they also have non-vocational aims, such as inculcat-
ing children and young adults with cultural values, or simply broaden-
ing students' knowledge and sharpening their minds. The frontier
between the two is uncertain and vague. In one recent case, the Court
held that the term "vocational training" does not exclude university
education, as most forms of it prepare students for participating in
26. Franqoise Gravier v. City of Liege, case 293/83, 1985 EUR. CT. REP. 593.
27. See, e.g., EEC treaty, art. 128.
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professional life. 28
A further issue is whether equal access to vocational training has
consequences not only for the level of tuition fees but also for the lib-
erty of public authorities to refuse scholarships to foreigners. The
Court has made a distinction between scholarships intended to cover
tuition and those intended to offset costs of living.29 Most developed
systems of subsidizing students, however, involve both elements, as the
Court has since discovered.30 Case law on this point has not yet found
an appropriate balance.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Taken together, the three lines of case law examined here suggest
that the treaty's scattered provisions on non-discrimination gradually
begin to amount to a general principle of equal protection. It is to be
recalled, in this respect, that the treaty includes not only rules forbid-
ding discrimination on grounds of nationality or sex, such as articles 7,
48 and 119, bui also prohibitions against discriminating between pro-
ducers or between consumers, for example, in its provisions on the
common agricultural policy and on antitrust law.3 It is interesting to
note that the evolution of the Court's case law reveals a certain affinity
between this branch of European law and American case law on equal
protection. It attempts to meet the same problems and, sometimes,
puts forward similar solutions, albeit in different conceptual clothing.
The American reader will have noticed how standards developed by
the U.S. Supreme Court for "suspect classifications," "adverse im-
pact," "penalizing immigration," and "overbroadness" have found
counterparts in the European Court's decisions.
The same observation applies to other American terms, like "state
action" or "job-related requirements," which are shorthand for
problems the European Court has also encountered on its way. The
"state action" problem arose in a somewhat peculiar manner. Accord-
ing to the treaty, Community directives are, unlike regulations, only
binding on the member states as to the result to be achieved; they leave
the national authorities free in their choice of form and methods. 32
Normally, directives are transposed into national law. Community
28. Vincent Blaizot v. University of Liege, case 214/86, 1988 EUR. CT. REP. 379.
29. Steven Brown v. Secretary of State for Scotland, case 197/86, judgment of June 21, 1988
(not yet reported).
30. Echternach and Moritz v. Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen, joint cases 389-
390/87, judgment of Mar. 15, 1989 (not yet reported).
31. EEC treaty, art. 40, § 3, art 85, § 1, and art. 86(c).
32. Id. art. 189.
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norms thus reach the citizen by way of national rules issued in order to
implement the directive. In a long line of decisions, the Court held
that provisions of a directive which are "unconditional and sufficiently
precise" may be relied upon by an individual against a member state
whenever the state failed to implement the directive. A different ap-
proach, said the Court, would be incompatible with the binding nature
of the directive.3 3 However, this binding nature exists only with re-
gard to the member state, not with regard to private citizens. The
Court has deduced from this premise that a directive cannot impose
obligations on a private individual and that a provision of a directive
may not be relied upon against such a person. As a result, female
workers may rely on equal treatment directives when involved in liti-
gation with public authorities, but not when their employer happens to
be a private business corporation. 34
The growing law of equal protection in the Community also shows
that the process of economic integration cannot be pursued in isola-
tion. It elicits social problems which only the courts can settle if the
political institutions are slow - as they often are - in adjusting to
new realities and to new views. The process thus shows a second par-
allel with experience in the United States, although judicial develop-
ments have not been quite so dramatic in Europe. Perhaps decisions
on discrimination for reasons of nationality or sex do not have the
same emotional intensity as those involving race. In thinking about
this aspect of equal protection, one finds that our theme may also en-
able us to look, in a general way, at the role of courts in the evolution
of legal principles.
The practical implementation of the principle of equal protection
has been the work of courts rather than of constitution makers, legisla-
tive bodies, or executives. This conclusion implies that very important
social issues have been decided by the judiciary when the other arms of
government failed to act, or were still pondering what to do. The U.S.
Supreme Court never hesitated to assume this role, and it would seem
that the European Court of Justice has been following the same
course.
33. Ursula Becker v. Finanzamt Munster-Innenstadt, case 8/81, 1982 EUR. CT. REP. 53.
34. Marshall v. Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Auth., case 152/84,
1986 EUR. CT. REP. 723.
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